Afridi. Image source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/charaka/

The fury that came out of the Indian online community either in support of or against Afridi had the usual Aman-ki-Asha defense or Pakistan-is-a-terror-supporter attack. I will not comment on either side of the arguments except that I saw many good arguments on both sides. However, I do wish to make a point about “Pakistan is a terrorist state” versus “Pakistanis are terrorist sympathizers” argument that seems to have conveniently folded itself into the argument associated with Afridi’s statements.

On one side, while many agree that the political establishment in Pakistan sympathizes with and actively supports terrorist acts against India, they caution that one should not claim that the state’s support for terrorism is the same as the people’s support for terrorism much like Muage vs. Zimbabweans. On the other side, there are many who argue that a state establishment cannot function without an approval from the masses (even a tacit approval through silence is sufficient). In the latter camp, Greatbong argues that assassination of moderates like Taseer points to a popular sympathy (albeit a tacit one) for Islamic fundamentalism.

I agree with the sentiment that one should not equate the actions of the political establishment with the people of the state. This statement is easy to defend when talking about the people of the state, but the same arguments do not hold when you are considering individuals. The difference is the similar to how statistical inferences, while applicable to a large dataset, become irrelevant when considering the outcome of a single event. Let me explain. While the American public may not favor massive human rights violations in Iraq and may even be against the war in Iraq, you cannot claim the same to be true of some American individual. I know many Americans who actively support America’s invasion of Iraq and deposing of Saddam Hussain. I also know many Americans who oppose it.

The American I know who oppose the Iraq war are quick to blame their political establishment and, if pressed, are willing to offer their apologies to Iraqies and an outright admission that they oppose their goverment’s actions.

Let’s go back and consider Afridi’s comments specifically with respect to this argument ”Pakistan is a terrorist state” versus “Pakistanis are terrorist sympathizers”. Reacting to Gautam Gambhir’s statement that India’s victory over Pakistan will help soothe the pain over 26/11 Mumbai attacks, Afridi said: “I think they were very stupid comments by Gautam Gambhir. I was not expecting this from Gautam. This is all politics, what do you know about who carried out the Mumbai attacks?” [source]

Despite overwhelming evidence that 26/11 attacks received support from Pakistani establishment, Afridi asserts that there is no knowledge of the perpetrators of 26/11. He could have distanced himself from the whole thing by simply saying “This is just politics.” and stopping there. But he did not. For some reason he felt compelled to defend the Pakistani establishment. That sounds like Afridi is batting for the Pakistani establishment. So I cannot give Afridi a reprieve on the ”Pakistan is a terrorist state” versus “Pakistanis are terrorist sympathizers” schism.

Contrary to common belief, the American export of terrorism or terrorists is not a recent phenomenon, nor has it been associated only with Islamic radicals or people of Middle Eastern, African or South Asian ethnic origin. This dynamic belies the American belief that our free, open and integrated multicultural society lessens the allure of radicalism and terrorism for US citizens.

Who do you think said that? Micheal Moore? Noam Chomsky? Nah! ‘Actually, its the CIA. That’s right, the American Central Intelligence Agency. Wikileaks has more…

The kind of lucidity and clarity in the news reports seemed unusual. Typically the reasons for such “high alert” is one of the following three:

1. Reactionary, that is, in response to confirmed terrorist activity. Examples:
   • July 14, 1997: Himachal Pradesh was put on alert after field officials admitted that terrorists have been entering Himachal for re-grouping and planning attacks [source].
   • June 28, 2003: Army formations were on full alert following a suicide attack on a Dogra battalion camp [source].
   • July 22, 2003: Army formations in Jammu & Kashmir were put of full alert following two major suicide attacks on army camps and intelligence reports that there may be more [source].
   • October 1, 2003: Troops along the Indo-Pak border were put on high alert after Pak army’s Border Action Teams provided cover fire to push terrorists into Jammu and Kashmir [source].
   • November 12, 2007: Army was placed on alert in Jammu & Kashmir after terrorist “sleeper cells” had become active [source].
2. Obvious: on occasions like the Republic day or Independence day, or during known periods of terrorist infiltration. Examples:
   • January 26, 2003: Delhi, Jammu & Kashmir, and the Northeast were put under high alert to safeguard against terrorist threats to disrupt the Republic Day celebrations [source].
   • March, 18 2004: Indian forces were put on hight alert because the melting snow along the LoC at the end of winter increases terrorist infiltration [source].
   • August 14, 2007: Security forces around New Delhi were on high alert for Independence day to safeguard against terror attacks [source].
   • August 15, 2008: India rolled out a security clampdown ahead of the Independence Day [source].
3. Secretive or vague information. Examples:
   • July 13, 2006: Army cantonments were put on high alert following intelligence reports that terrorists could carry our suicide attacks [source].
   • January 11, 2007: Airports across India were put on high alter follows intelligence reports on possible attempt by terrorists to hijack an aircraft or storm airport terminals [source].
   • January 16, 2008: Central security agencies were put on guard following intelligence reports of a possible suicide attack by a Pakistan-based militant group on “VIPs” in Jammu & Kashmir [source].

In contrast the news articles on possible hijacking and paragliding suicide attacks provided us with a lot more and specific information. It seemed to come with more authority, almost trying to convince us that the government is doing its job and is very serious about security. Looks like among the lessons learnt from 26/11 (and mind you that there ARE changes in policy and execution effected by those lessons) is that it is not sufficient to just do your job, you need to make sure that your stakeholders (the people of India) know that you are doing your job. In other words PR/marketing. So are we going to see more ‘transparency’ from the government on intelligence information and credibility of terrorists threats?

Interestingly, in April 2003, security was beefed up around the Vaishno Devi Temple in Jammu & Kashmir following (specific) intelligence warning about a possible suicide attack [source news article]. The news article reported: “Although inputs regarding general threat perceptions are received regularly, the threat is specific this time,” the sources said. So, a less flattering interpretation is that Indian intelligence has been doing what it can, but its work was of really poor quality, and hence the secretive or vague information on terror threats, and hence a catastrophic intelligence failure that lead to 26/11. Post-26/11, there has been a revamping of the Intelligence and now we are finally getting quality intelligence.

A more cynical possibility is that the 2003 Vaishno Devi alter, and the recent two specific intelligence alert were all just accidents! Indian Intelligence simply got lucky, and so don’t expect anything much to change at all!

Wonder where the truth really lies…